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The Face of Terrorism: Global Movement or Global Network?

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1 PROCEEDINGS

2 MR. ISHAM: Thank you very much. The topic
3 today is Global Terrorism. We'll try to get a handle on
4 how to define it, what it is, how it's changed and perhaps
5 take a crack at trying to find a few strategies for
6 combating it. We have a very distinguished and diverse
7 panel today. Starting on the far right, Professor Husain
8 Haqqani, who is a professor at Boston University and a
9 long-time, a very distinguished diplomat in Pakistani
10 service, served with several heads of state in Pakistan,
11 and prime ministers and also served as a journalist. So
12 he has reached several worlds.

13 To his left, Reza Aslan, who is a commentator
14 for NPR and for CBS News -- which I should add is
15 competition, but it's okay, and is one of the emerging,
16 very interesting voices on terrorism today. And to his
17 left, Dalia Mogahed, who works for the Gallup
18 Organization; and she has been involved in a very
19 interesting survey of Muslims worldwide in more than 39
20 countries, and I think we'll find that to be very
21 interesting.

22 So I'd like to begin, just sort of framing the

1 issues a little bit and I think everybody has a general
2 understanding of what some of the problems are that we're
3 facing today. Just in the last few days, of course we've
4 had attacks in the UK which we're still getting some
5 definition. I think it's a little bit too early to say
6 what that is.

7 Perhaps some of our panelists will have some
8 thoughts, but it's really just emerging as the arrests are
9 being made and people are being rounded up. Fortunately
10 it seems that tradecraft in this case was a little short.
11 But in any case, it's a reminder once again that people
12 are out there that are motivated to kill Westerners and
13 will do -- go to extreme lengths to do so.

14 The National Counterterrorism Center in
15 Washington estimated that in 2006, last calendar year,
16 there were more than 14,000 terrorist attacks resulting in
17 more than 20,000 deaths. This is an extraordinary number.
18 It's more than a 25 percent increase over 2005 in number
19 of attacks, and more than 40 percent increase in number of
20 deaths.

21 Now many of those, almost 7000, took place in
22 Afghanistan and Iraq. But I think the clear message is

1 that terrorism is very much alive and that in many cases
2 Al-Qaeda is the guiding spirit although the direction
3 varies from place to place and that's one of the things
4 that we want to talk about today.

5 I think that one thing that can also be said is
6 that in the 5 years -- more than 5 years since 9/11, and
7 since the U.S.-led attacks in both Afghanistan and
8 Pakistan -- I'm sorry, Afghanistan and Iraq, there have
9 been -- Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have reemerged and is
10 reconstituted, and I think established themselves as
11 representing a real global Islamist threat, a global
12 terrorist threat of which I think Al-Qaeda remains the
13 dominant leader, even though many of their leadership,
14 more than 50 percent of their leadership has been either
15 killed or arrested.

16 The two top leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman
17 al-Zawahiri remain alive. We hear from them from time to
18 time. We hear from Zawahiri a lot, we hear from Bin Laden
19 less so, but he appears to still be alive. They have
20 active affiliates in more than 40 countries worldwide that
21 are affiliated either ideologically or more directly or
22 operationally with Al-Qaeda. They have made -- exploited

1 the Internet in ways that are evolving everyday. It's
2 estimated that there are more than 4,000 jihadist websites
3 out there that in one form or another or spreading the
4 word. This creates a -- almost a community of Islamist
5 propaganda and ideology, in which they show videos and
6 speeches, and martyrdom operations as they call them, and
7 provides everything down to very technical information.
8 So the Internet has provided an enormous vehicle for these
9 movements to link up internationally.

10 So I think that today what I'd like to try to do
11 in organizing this panel is take the first part and try to
12 diagnose a little bit of the problem with our speakers
13 here, and then address some of the treatments or some of
14 the ways in which the strategies in which we should combat
15 this.

16 So I think the first step is just to try to
17 define what the nature of this global threat is, if in
18 fact it is global. Is it an organization, is it a
19 movement, is it a network, is it an affiliation of
20 networks, what's the operational relationship between the
21 high command, if you will, and of Bin Laden and Zawahiri
22 and the various affiliates or franchises, what are the

1 seams in the global environment that these folks exploit
2 or manage to take advantage of? What degree is the threat
3 dependent on the sympathy and support of the populations
4 that they move in and operate in, how much support do
5 those populations provide, do they provide that support
6 because they're intimidated to do so or threatened to do
7 so, or because they actually have some affinity for these
8 operators? And then we'll, as I said, try to take a crack
9 at some counterterrorist strategies and what the West and
10 the United States particularly is doing wrong and how they
11 might be able to do it right, how they might be able to do
12 it better.

13 So I'd like to begin with Husain Haqqani, who
14 has had long experience with the extremists in his country
15 Pakistan of course, going back to the origins of Al-Qaeda.
16 And I think maybe you could give us a little bit of your
17 perspective on how you see the movement having changed or
18 how Bin Laden's leadership has changed, and also how
19 they've managed after having been expelled from
20 Afghanistan in October of 2001 by the U.S.-led invasion
21 and how they have managed to reconstitute in the --
22 particularly in the Pakistani tribal areas along the

1 border there and at this point seems to have managed to
2 put back many of their camps and command and control
3 operations.

4 MR. HAQQANI: Thank you, Chris. Let me begin by
5 saying that sometimes we become prisoners of our clichés.
6 So one of the clichés is that the world changed on 9/11,
7 and that's not true. What happened on 9/11 essentially
8 was that Americans became more aware of a phenomenon in
9 the world that had been going on for a while.

10 The British had encountered terrorism in the
11 form of the IRA. The Sri Lankans had encountered
12 terrorism in the form of the Tamil Tigers, the Israelis
13 had encountered terrorism on a day-to-day basis for a long
14 time, and 9/11 woke America up to the whole notion of
15 terrorism. So then we declared war against terror. And
16 there is a presumption that somehow the process of
17 terrorism and its organization and its threat should be
18 understood in the context of what happened on 9/11 and
19 after, not before. Let's go back a little.

20 Al-Qaeda -- Al-Qaeda was born out of the jihad
21 against the Soviets, which the United States fully
22 supported. I was there reporting on it and in fact one of

1 my notebooks says, and I don't have any recollection of
2 that, that amongst the people I met during the jihad
3 covering the story was a man called Osama Bin Mohammed Bin
4 Laden. So I presumably shook his hand, don't know if
5 that's --

6 MR. ISHAM: He was tall?

7 MR. HAQQANI: Very tall man --

8 (Laughter)

9 MR. ISHAM: Hard to miss.

10 MR. HAQQANI: But his teacher was the important
11 guy at that time, Abdullah Azzam. And when you were
12 saying his terrorism and network, his Al-Qaeda network --
13 I would use a totally different word, it's an idea.
14 Terrorism as a tactic and a strategy has been around for a
15 long time, but it has usually been used for a specific
16 purpose of the IRA wanting the British out of Northern
17 Ireland. The Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers wanting a state for
18 themselves.

19 Going back into history, the anarchists had the
20 idea of changing the structure of Europe and how the world
21 was governed, and they used terrorism. Al-Qaeda is an
22 idea that the Muslims of the world can use terror to

1 change the global order of things and overcome the
2 humiliation and weakness that they say is the
3 characteristic of the Muslim world today. And one must
4 remember the Muslim's sense of history.

5 Reza will probably enlighten you more on that.
6 But the fact of the matter is that unlike the United
7 States, where if you want to be dismissive about someone
8 we say, "Chris, he is history," in the Muslim world, the
9 approach to history is different. History is something of
10 value, and therefore everybody wants to redeem history --
11 in fact -- redeem themselves before history.

12 We were important ones, we were powerful ones,
13 we are weak, we are humiliated now, the fact of the Muslim
14 world right now; 57 countries with a GDP less than that of
15 France. The Arab world with about 300 million people, per
16 capita consumption of books less than the per capita
17 consumption of books in Greece which has a population of
18 15 million.

19 There are only 500 universities in the entire
20 Muslim world for 1.4 billion people, compare that with
21 8000 in India. So how is this community going to compete
22 -- and I am part of it, and I also think those questions.

1 I come up with different answers than Osama Bin Laden
2 does, thank God for that.

3 (Laughter)

4 SPEAKER: It's good.

5 MR. HAQQANI: But their idea -- so what happened
6 was that after beating the Soviet Union with the help of
7 the international community, the hardcore Islamist
8 jihadists inspired by Abdullah Azzam, Osama Bin Laden's
9 teacher. And Azzam wrote a very important book in defense
10 of Muslim lands, in which he came up with the idea that
11 actually what we can do is, we can start this on a global
12 basis.

13 So it's like -- it's like somebody who comes up
14 with the idea -- and I don't know who it was, who came up
15 with the idea that, you know, the corporation and the
16 company in one country can make profit only up to a point,
17 let's go global. This is the idea of the globalization of
18 the idea of terrorism. That's what Al-Qaeda is, that's
19 different from everybody else, point number 1.

20 Point number 2, what has happened? They got
21 battle hardened in Afghanistan and that was one
22 generation. They got pushed out of Afghanistan after

1 9/11, but immediately realized one thing, that if there
2 are more theaters of war for us to get more battle
3 hardened people, then we can replicate the experiment in
4 more places. So the war against terror inadvertently
5 provided them with more theaters of operation, where
6 they're training. I don't know if you saw a piece -- and
7 one shouldn't always talk about what one has written, but
8 I did a piece a year or two ago in (*italics*) The New
9 Republic about the so-called suicide bombers or martyrs in
10 Iraq.

11 And what was happening was they had these
12 biographies very adulatory, and what they were trying to
13 do was they were trying to inspire other people into
14 saying, "You know what, the previous generation fought the
15 Soviets and got battle hardened and we've sustained the
16 jihad for 20-30 years since then. Now Iraq is the theater
17 where a new generation can go and get trained and then go
18 back, and then replicate.

19 So these can become battle hardened trained
20 people who have fought the Americans and therefore will
21 have learned new tactics and new methods, and new ways of
22 making improvised explosive devices and replicate them in

1 many, many, many theaters of the world; which is why the
2 number of acts of terrorism around the world is
3 increasing, not decreasing.

4 And the third thing is that they have realized
5 that instead of having a hierarchical organization, it's
6 better for them to have a virtual organization. So Osama
7 Bin Laden is a figurehead, he is a symbol. But we don't
8 really know if he actually controls the operations of Al-
9 Qaeda in Iraq, or Al-Qaeda affiliate in Pakistan, or Al-
10 Qaeda affiliate in Indonesia. There is a great degree of
11 autonomy, not centralization.

12 And with that great degree of autonomy, the most
13 important thing becomes again, back to the word "idea."
14 It's the idea of terrorism and therefore how many people
15 can you appeal to and make them feel, "You know, what, all
16 this business of overcoming humiliation, the best way of
17 doing it is blowing myself up." How many people can you
18 persuade to do that?

19 And there the battle of hearts and minds becomes
20 very important, which the United States is losing
21 miserably, as I am sure Dalia's statistics will tell.

22 Last point, polling data in the Muslim world

1 indicates that an overwhelming majority of Muslims do not
2 agree with the tactics and methods of Al-Qaeda, a lot of
3 them saying that they don't consider that Islamic. So
4 that's the positive. The negative is, a majority of them
5 say, that they find the critique of the global order that
6 Al-Qaeda presents as valid, so out of this maybe are born
7 new ideas and new methods of tackling the same problem.
8 And an overwhelming majority of Muslims, even in American
9 allied countries, seem to believe that Islam is in danger.
10 There is a serious threat to Islam and there is a serious
11 threat to Muslims, which I will come to later because I
12 want other participants to come in at this point.

13 So that in my thinking is -- are the contours of
14 the problem. It's an idea, a violent idea, not a
15 hierarchical organization, multiplying quite fast, because
16 of decentralization. The U.S. is a little behind. For
17 example, when we say half of their leadership has been
18 decapitated, it's half of the leadership we know. It's
19 the half of the leadership that came to fore as a result
20 of Al-Qaeda.

21 Now, basically there are baby Al-Qaedas being
22 born, baby Al-Qaedas being organized that have no organic

1 connection to the original Osama Bin Laden Al-Qaeda.
2 These are franchisees who are using the franchise, or the
3 trade mark without official sanction. They're just
4 copycats, pirates, so to speak, you know, to use an
5 intellectual property concept, they're just replicating
6 the CD-ROMs and they're doing just as well as a result in
7 multiplying the problem.

8 MR. ISHAM: Well, that's good, that certainly
9 gets us off to a good start and certainly your point is
10 well taken on the -- as Rumsfeld had called them, "The
11 unknown unknowns." What you don't know you don't know --

12 MR. HAQQANI: I'm so glad you used Rumsfeld's
13 expression before I could.

14 (Laughter)

15 MR. ISHAM: Yeah. Reza Aslan, let's pick up on
16 where Husain left off. And maybe you could try to give us
17 a sense of how you see this movement and not just Al-Qaeda
18 but really a global jihadist movement, and what are the
19 connections, what are the links between these movements,
20 what is the link between the movements in Algeria, the
21 North Africa to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, to Jemaah Islamiyah in
22 Indonesia. What are the affiliations and how strong are

1 those?

2 MR. ASLAN: That's a great question. And I
3 think it's important for us to actually move beyond Al-
4 Qaeda for a moment because well, Al-Qaeda does represent a
5 very serious threat. They essentially are just one
6 manifestation of a larger movement called jihadism, which
7 is not, you know, an enemy by any means, it is not an
8 organization it's an idea. And an idea that is only a
9 couple of decades old, but which has I think, in many ways
10 risen to the surface and has become very dominant in the
11 discussions taking place in the Arab and Muslim world
12 about local issues and global issues.

13 But I think it's important for a moment to stop
14 and define exactly what it is that we're talking about
15 when we say "jihadism" or "jihadist." This term which by
16 the way is widely recognized in the Arab world, "jihadiya"
17 is how it's -- as it's referred to, refers very
18 specifically to a global transnational movement of violent
19 Islamic Puritanism, Sunni Islamic Puritanism.

20 It is a movement that wants to rid the world of
21 the nation state, it's anti-nationalist, which is why
22 referring to it as "fascist" as it's so often referred to,

1 is so absurd. And fascism is essentially a worship of the
2 state. To the jihadists, the state is about as anti-
3 Islamic as an idea as one can get. It is a movement that
4 made a very strategic decision at a certain period in its
5 formation, in which they decided that although so many of
6 these Islamic terrorist organizations or non-state
7 entities throughout that region that are fighting
8 nationalist or local conflicts against what in jihadist
9 terminology is referred to as "The near enemy" -- in other
10 words, the individuals, institutions, political and
11 religious organizations of their own nation states, in
12 their own neighborhoods -- the fights should be against
13 them with the ultimate goal of transforming the nation
14 state into an Islamic state.

15 What jihadism proposed in a very brilliant
16 innovation to this was that war is unwinnable in a sense,
17 because where we don't have either the manpower or the
18 influence, or the ability to turn Egypt into an Islamic
19 state, to turn Palestine into an Islamic state, to turn
20 you know, Algeria into an Islamic state. So rather than
21 focusing on the near enemy, what we ought to do from now
22 on is to focus on the far enemy, to focus -- to bring this

1 war to the United States, to the West with a notion of,
2 "Certainly we're not going to win a war. There is nothing
3 that we can do to defeat the United States. We will never
4 ever recreate the caliphate. And so it's an absurd
5 notion, it's absolutely impossible. It is impossible for
6 us to rid the world of Israel, it will never ever happen.
7 But that's not the point. The point is, in attacking the
8 far enemy; you drag them into this internal conflict as a
9 mobilizing force, as a polarizing force to essentially win
10 the internal battle. By bringing the West into this
11 fight, you have now a very easy target that can create an
12 idea of "us" versus "them", that all Muslims regardless of
13 their political affiliation or their piety can wrap their
14 minds around in some sense.

15 So in other words, it is a means of creating a
16 collective identity. And that term is one that I think is
17 very important when talking about jihadism, because as a
18 trans-nationalist movement, as a movement that goes beyond
19 any kind of cultural or national or ethnic borders, it has
20 as one of its primary focuses, the attempt to create a new
21 kind of identity, an identity that goes even beyond
22 traditional religious affiliations.

1 So whether you're a Hanbali Sunni or a Hanafi
2 Sunni, whether you're an Egyptian Muslim or you're an
3 Algerian Muslim, I think is that -- is that the Homeland
4 security, is somebody just cutting me off?

5 (Laughter)

6 MR. ASLAN: Can you still hear me?

7 SPEAKER: Yeah.

8 MR. ASLAN: Okay. That rather than doing that,
9 you create a new identity that links you not with your own
10 state, not with your own community, not with your own
11 sect, but with this new virtual community -- and I used
12 that term deliberately, because it is a community that
13 exists primarily online than anything else -- and a new
14 identity can be fashioned through this by connecting
15 grievances -- and again, to really get into this issue of
16 grievances, I'll come back to it when we talk about how to
17 address the problem. Right now, just to figure out what
18 the problem is.

19 But by connecting these very legitimate
20 grievances that people have across national --
21 nationalities across ethnicities by connecting say, the
22 plight of the Palestinians in Gaza to the lack of economic

1 development in Algeria to the lack of political
2 participation say in Egypt, you connect these seemingly
3 disparate grievances into one larger grievance that says
4 essentially all of these things are connected by the fact
5 that you are under attack by this westernizing, crusading
6 colonialist force and that the only way to address your
7 individual grievances is to connect all of these
8 grievances into one movement, into one identity and then
9 hopefully that identity will eventually foster collective
10 action. Now what's really truly -- by the way what's
11 truly fascinating about this is particularly when it comes
12 to, you know, the ideologues -- even Bin Laden and
13 Zawahiri -- is how brilliant they are in using these
14 legitimate grievances.

15 So yes, of course, they'll bring up the
16 exploding resources of the Muslim world or, you know, the
17 Palestinian Intifada issues et cetera. But then they'll
18 also bring up things like global warming. "America is
19 responsible for global warming. And therefore you know,
20 you need to reach out against it."

21 Now, what in the world has Al-Qaeda ever done
22 for global warming? Absolutely nothing. But that's not

1 the point. They're trying to expand the grievances of the
2 developing world in order to connect them all into this
3 larger master narrative which is that we're not
4 terrorists, we're anti-imperialists. We're fighting for
5 not just the rights of Muslims to have an identity, but in
6 short we're fighting for the rights of all subject
7 peoples. There is a reason why if you go to Nicaragua
8 you'll see people with Bin Laden T-shirts like he is Che
9 Guevara, because to them he is Che Guevara. They have no
10 conception of his ideology and certainly as Professor
11 Haqqani said, they do not share his tactics, they don't
12 condone his tactics.

13 But they recognize the movement as a legitimate
14 one, as one that addresses legitimate grievances though in
15 an illegitimate way. Now that movement again, as was
16 said, is one fight against that movement. The fight
17 against Al-Qaeda -- one can make an argument that's going
18 fairly well. The fight against the movement is not. It's
19 going very, very poorly and again, you know, just look at
20 Dalia's statistics to understand that.

21 MR. ISHAM: Well, it's a good -- that's an
22 excellent setup for Dalia. And I think one of the things

1 that we need to try to get out here is the degree to which
2 this message that you've described is playing, and how
3 it's playing. There are more than a billion Muslims
4 worldwide, and as Mao famously said, the guerilla must
5 move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.

6 So the question to you Dalia is, how friendly is
7 that sea for Al-Qaeda and its affiliate jihadists?

8 MS. MOGAHED: Thank you, Chris. I think it's
9 very interestingly said about Nicaragua. It actually
10 reminds me of a poll, not by us, but by Zogby that found
11 that the top foremost respected or most admired political
12 leaders outside of the respondents' country were number 1,
13 Ahmadinejad, number 2, Jacques Chirac, number 3, Hassan
14 Nasrallah and number 4, Hugo Chavez. The only thing those
15 four have in common of course is that they're of course
16 standing up to the United States, or were.

17 What I would like to do is really test some of
18 the conventional wisdom on that sympathy -- how much there
19 is of it and then that group that does lend a sympathetic
20 ear to the tactics of Al-Qaeda, what do they look like,
21 what do they have in common with the majority and what is
22 different about them, and in so doing really built a

1 theory from the ground up using empirical data. And what
2 I'm -- will base it on very quickly is nationwide
3 representative survey research in over 39 predominantly
4 Muslim countries.

5 So when we asked the question what percentage of
6 people support the attacks of 9/11 -- just simple
7 question; we found that that percentage worldwide over, if
8 you take a weighted average across the Muslim world is 7
9 percent. Now is that high or low? I can't answer that.
10 What we do know is when we ask questions that don't
11 pertain to a specific attack like 9/11; we just look at
12 support for attacks on civilians. We find that Muslims
13 are on average less likely than the American public to
14 support attacks on civilians, believe it or not.

15 So the concept of attacking civilians, in
16 general as a generic concept is not something that Muslims
17 sign up for. It's explicitly prohibited in the Islamic
18 discourse. In fact, it is funny to note that even Bin
19 Laden when asked in 2001 how can you justify 9/11, your
20 satisfaction at the attacks of 9/11, in light of Islamic
21 teachings, his response actually was to cite Hadith, a
22 prophetic tradition that said that the Prophet forbid

1 targeting women and children in war, but that no longer
2 applies because the world is a different place.

3 So if you're looking for revisionism of this
4 jihad, look no further, Bin Laden is very willing to
5 redefine and reinterpret the text. So that 7 percent will
6 call them a high-conflict group. What is special about
7 them and what isn't? So let's look at what they first
8 have in common with the general population. Do they hate
9 freedom? The answer is no. There are in fact slightly
10 more likely to say that democracy will help Muslims
11 progress.

12 So one thing that came out of our data in
13 general is that Muslims when asked what you admire most
14 about the West, the number 1 most frequent response is
15 technology, the number 2 most frequent response is around
16 government accountability, transparency, the kinds of
17 things we would call democratic principles. And the high-
18 conflict group is no different, in fact slightly more
19 likely to express such sentiment.

20 Are they jobless? The answer again is no.
21 There is absolutely no difference in the percentage of
22 employment between the high-conflict group and the rest.

1 Are they hopeless for the future? Do they have simply a
2 lack of hope?

3 Again, the answer is no. They're slightly more
4 likely to have optimism, in fact, for the future of their
5 own countries. Now, are they less likely to be concerned
6 about better relations with the West? Again, no.

7 They're as likely as the general population to
8 say that better relations with the West is a personal
9 concern, but they're more likely to think the West has no
10 concern for better relations, which will feed into what
11 actually I think is driving some of the sentiment.

12 A sense of humiliation has already been
13 discussed, actually cuts across the Muslim world. It's
14 not specifically among the high-conflict group that
15 humiliation really drives their sympathy. Humiliation is
16 something felt very strongly among Muslims as a whole. So
17 for example, a respondent in Pakistan said, "A whole lobby
18 of the West is working against the Muslims and damaging
19 our image. They should stop and respect Islamic values."

20 Very quickly, a respondent in Morocco, "The West
21 has to change and moderate their attitude towards Muslims.
22 They have to stop looking down on our people." And

1 finally, I'm going to read you a respondent from Lebanon,
2 because I think this is very telling.

3 "They should consider us as humans and should
4 end the war against Muslims and Islam." I guess that
5 pretty much sums it up. And finally religiosity, the big
6 red herring. They're no more likely to be religious
7 actually than the general population. The high-conflict
8 group are no more likely to go to the mosque or no more
9 likely to say that religion is an important part of their
10 life.

11 Now, religion does have a role to play; but I'll
12 explain what I think the role of religion actually is.
13 Now, what is different -- those were the things they have
14 actually in common, what is different about them? They
15 have a much higher sense of threat than the general
16 population. So they are more likely to feel that the
17 United States of America is an eminent threat to their
18 nation and their way of life.

19 So when asked, "What is the greatest fear that
20 you have in your life?" the general population would talk
21 about things like inflation or crime or maybe even civil
22 war, whereas the high-conflict group, the most frequent

1 response is about U.S. domination and U.S. occupation --
2 even in countries where there is essentially no real
3 threat of that. But that is the most -- at the top of my
4 most -- greatest fear that they have. They also have a
5 much greater sense of being dominated and controlled by
6 the West. So they're much more likely to say that the
7 United States will not allow people in their region to
8 fashion their own political future, that the U.S. is not
9 serious about democratizing the Muslim world.

10 They also have a lack of faith, a huge
11 skepticism as to the goodwill of the West. They say the
12 United States or the West in general, does not care about
13 better relations with the Muslim world, and they also feel
14 that a time will never come when better relations will
15 happen.

16 So if you combine this combustible foundation of
17 feeling humiliated -- and that cuts across like I said --
18 but then you add to that a sense of threat; acute threat,
19 and a sense of hopelessness in not their own future, but
20 in the prospect of change through peaceful or political or
21 diplomatic means, and that cocktail turns into a
22 justification of violent -- a violent response to what

1 they feel is a very real threat. Some interesting
2 demographic realities of this high-conflict group -- and
3 it might not surprise some of you who've been actually
4 following some of the people who are arrested for
5 attempting terrorism. They are actually more likely to be
6 educated and affluent than the general population. So the
7 people that were captured in Britain were all medical
8 doctors, and it fits exactly with the data we're finding
9 across the board.

10 Interestingly, they're more likely to be
11 supervisors at work than the general population. And that
12 in fact feeds into this problem a sense of humiliation
13 combined with a bigger ego. A bigger sense of if you
14 will, self-actualization and a perception that they should
15 be free to fashion their own political, social and
16 cultural future.

17 And so when you combine these factors, what you
18 find is what drives the sense of sympathy for a violent
19 response to grievances that most people actually recognize
20 or perceive to be true, is that it's a perceived injustice
21 that this group does not think is something you have to
22 take. It's a very violent reaction to a perception of

1 one's dignity, pride and ego being trampled on, and
2 because of their higher education, their higher economic
3 status, those kinds of emotions are more readily, sort of,
4 available to them than the general population who has much
5 more personal concerns around just, you know, job creation
6 or local issues instead of this transnational perception
7 of being attacked or threatened as a whole, as an omen.

8 MR. ISHAM: Well, that's very interesting. I
9 think one of the clear themes that has emerged that all
10 three of you touched on is a sense in the Muslim world or
11 at least in a significant part of the Muslim world -- and
12 let's keep in mind, even though that 7 percent is a
13 minority, it is still by my number 70 million people.

14 MR. HAQQANI: Absolutely.

15 MR. ISHAM: So 70 million people who are really
16 not happy. And I think certainly, when you expand that
17 out, I'm sure you'll find that the numbers go way up once
18 you start, once you start looking at just the
19 dissatisfaction overall with the United States in
20 particular and with the West in general.

21 I guess what I'd like to drill down a bit on
22 here, beginning with Husain is, to what degree do you

1 think this sense is rational? And is it -- is there
2 something that we in the West take on board here, because
3 I must say, you know, one talks to Americans and American
4 policy makers, and many of them will say, "You know, we
5 don't really understand this, because actually a lot of
6 things we've done have been pro-Muslim. I mean we helped
7 win the jihad against the Soviets; we got the Soviets out
8 of Afghanistan. We helped belatedly, but we helped in
9 Bosnia, we helped in Kosovo, in Muslim countries; we were
10 on the right side of those issues."

11 In Iraq, they could argue that we liberated Iraq
12 which was under the thumb of a brutal dictator who had
13 killed millions of their own -- of his own people and
14 people in neighboring countries who were also Muslims. We
15 liberated that country from a brutal dictator, and paved
16 the way for a democratic, albeit Shiite government to come
17 into power.

18 I mean, the argument -- the counterargument to
19 this is that, you know, the sense in the Muslim world,
20 while real is somewhat unfair.

21 MR. HAQQANI: Chris, let me begin by saying that
22 most broad consensus about something are never all

1 rationally thought out. Let's just look at these ideas --
2 Aspen Ideas Festival. There are only two sessions in
3 which Islam is going to be discussed. 1.4 billion people,
4 57 countries, one of the most important regions, the
5 Middle East, South Asia. Islam is the biggest religion in
6 South Asia, India emerging. Everybody knows India, China
7 is going to, you know, but how many sessions and what are
8 the sessions? One is terrorism, where the three of us are
9 discussing Islam in a circuitous manner. The other one is
10 the usual, you know, is Islam compatible with liberal
11 democracy, which about 100 years ago --

12 SPEAKER: Sorry, I am Ayaan Hirsi Ali (phonetic)
13 --

14 MR. HAQQANI: No, no, 100 years ago, you know,
15 there was no Catholic majority country that was a
16 democracy and people were debating and some people could
17 have turned around, is Catholicism compatible with
18 democracy instead of understanding -- so let me just say -
19 -

20 MR. ISHAM: You'll have to take that up with the
21 --

22 MR. HAQQANI: No, no, I am not taking it up with

1 --

2 (Laughter)

3 MR. HAQQANI: I am not taking it up with anyone,
4 I am just pointing out that this is like these broad --
5 all broad generalizations about people; are emotional or
6 broad aggregations, they're not always rational. So let
7 me just say that at the outset. America's view of how the
8 Muslim world is as irrational as the Muslim world's
9 attitude is about America. That is the point I was trying
10 to make.

11 Second, as far as the specific thing is
12 concerned, you see, the Muslim sense of humiliation is not
13 -- since I came to the U.S., one of my biggest problems is
14 whenever I give out a lecture, somebody would raise their
15 hand and I now, I call it the predictable question, it is,
16 "So what can we do about it?"

17 MR. ISHAM: You don't want to --

18 MR. HAQQANI: America has always looked upon the
19 world as a problem to solve, not as a situation and a
20 circumstance to understand. That's the American way, you
21 know, tell me how to fix it.

22 MR. ISHAM: Can't base it on --

1 MR. HAQQANI: And you can't do that with people.
2 It's like 1.4 billion people needing therapy, will they
3 end up going to one psychotherapist that's going to do
4 that. This is about --

5 (Laughter)

6 MR. HAQQANI: We understand it when it comes to
7 individuals. You know, we want to understand their
8 personal history, so how were you treated as a child, how
9 were your relations with your mom? Well, when we are
10 talking about a community we don't want to do that, we
11 don't want to understand. The President of the United
12 States didn't know anything about Shias and Sunnis before
13 he went into Iraq, you know.

14 Why, because history doesn't matter. It doesn't
15 matter what the collective experience of a community is.
16 Now, yes, the U.S. as a government, et cetera has quite
17 often been on the right side of the issues with the
18 Muslims than it has been on the wrong side. But there are
19 the wrong sides that have the greater impact -- bringing
20 the Shah back through the CIA coup of 1953.

21 Americans don't want to remember that. Waiting
22 too long in the case of Bosnia when there was a genocide

1 taking place, and then too only responding because Bosnia
2 was one place where the Muslims and the Jewish communities
3 worked together and both were being massacred, you know.
4 So the way these guys see it, well, anybody who had the
5 clout in Washington to make people think about it, then
6 they move them. With the creation of Pakistan in 1947,
7 the U.S. wasn't particularly -- Time Magazine actually
8 said, you know, something with, you know -- at that time
9 was very dismissive about the creation of Pakistan. So
10 the Pakistanis had to prove themselves by getting --
11 making nuclear weapons, which is not a good idea in my
12 opinion, but that's how it happens.

13 Then there is this whole general feeling of
14 being looked down upon, which is very real, let's be
15 honest. And it has reasons. My answer, when I am talking
16 to a Muslim audience I talk differently. I say, "You're
17 looked down upon because you bring it upon yourself."
18 These are your statistics.

19 You have 47 percent illiteracy, you have this,
20 that, that; that's what I tell the Muslims. But that's
21 the problem of the interlocutor. I have to tell them that
22 they "suck."

1 (Laughter)

2 MR. HAQQANI: But then I have to tell you all
3 that you make them feel that they suck much worse, and so
4 this is like -- this is like a global issue. For example,
5 dismissiveness, there is an overall dismissiveness about
6 the Muslims. And people talk about, instead of looking at
7 for example, religious reform -- everybody says there
8 should be a reformation in the Muslim world. But
9 everybody forgets Christian reformation was a religious
10 process.

11 Jewish reformation was a religious process. It
12 was a Rabbi who started saying -- when it comes to Islam
13 who do we want to do the reformation? People who start
14 their books by saying, "I'm so annoyed with Islam, I've
15 become an atheist."

16 Are they going to lead the reformation in Islam?
17 They're not. And so all these things then create a
18 cumulative effect, which is psychological. It's not
19 logical, it's psychological. Specific policies, yeah,
20 maybe making fewer wars in the Muslim world may be a good
21 idea, because that does -- going back to the Afghan war,
22 hey, were the Afghans desirous of that war? Did the

1 Afghans support it? The groups that the U.S. backed were
2 the nastiest groups.

3 Well, I don't know if you covered that war; I
4 did. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who, now the Americans want to
5 destroy, was the biggest recipient of American aid. He is
6 the guy who used to slit the Russians' throats. And the
7 code of conduct amongst the journalists was, you're not
8 going to report about the slitting of the throats, because
9 that's too gory, but we're going to present it on evening
10 news hours, this great jihad against -- this great effort.

11 The word Mujahideen -- go back to the newspapers
12 of the 1980s. The word Mujahideen was used as a great
13 positive in American newspapers including -- including the
14 conservative press.

15 The Wall Street Journal editorial page used to
16 be adulatory about the Mujahideen, the same people who
17 actually -- they've just transferred the technology of
18 slitting throats from Russians to Americans,
19 unfortunately. In principle, we shouldn't have
20 appreciated and agreed with the slitting of the throats
21 per se.

22 And Muslims like myself who used to get queasy

1 about it, we have that little bond to pick with Americans
2 too that when you do get it. The problem with the United
3 States is - problem is that the Muslims are high
4 maintenance in terms of engagement. And they want
5 engagement, and the United States wants to be involved in
6 the world without being engaged with the world.

7 The U.S. gets along very well with not having to
8 learn too many facts -- just as I keep -- in my classes
9 anybody who pronounces -- mispronounces Iraq and says "I-
10 raq" (phonetic) I always say to them, "Guys, if a country
11 is worth fighting for, it's worth learning how to
12 pronounce its name." So this lack of engagement makes the
13 Muslim's sense of humiliation and being rundown and look
14 down and look down greater than it would be if the
15 Americans were a little smarter about engaging with --

16 MR. ISHAM: Also, I think you put your finger on
17 something too, which is Americans generally have very
18 short attention spans, and --

19 MR. HAQQANI: Absolutely, we want to know what
20 happened, you know, we don't want to use our imagination,
21 we want to know the end of the sopranos and it has to end
22 in five years.

1 MR. ISHAM: Right.

2 MR. HAQQANI: The Muslim saga has been going on
3 for 14 centuries, and will probably go on for another 100
4 years. On a lighter note, the Reverend Franklin Graham
5 said, in eight years we can try and bring Iraq unto
6 Christ. And my response was, "Good luck, Reverend" -- not
7 in person, but you know, in an article -- I said, "Good
8 luck, they got the message of Christ 14 centuries before
9 you did, because in America it's very easy to think that
10 Christianity started here, but you know, they had it a few
11 years before you."

12 Hasn't worked in that period, you can't -- don't
13 set these deadlines. I mean, I by the way don't want a
14 deadline for the end of the Iraq war, but I don't want a
15 deadline for "So Husain, please tell us when is the Muslim
16 world going to be okay and we're going to be friends, you
17 know, 6 months, 6 years?" No -- 600 years, start thinking
18 big.

19 MR. ISHAM: Right.

20 (Laughter)

21 MR. ISHAM: Reza, what do you -- what do you
22 have to -- what's your perspective on this question of the

1 humiliation and the degree to which it's rational? And
2 I'd also like you to talk a little bit about the role of
3 the media, particularly the Arab media which I think is
4 going through a revolution over the last 10 years, with
5 the advent particularly of satellite channels such as Al
6 Jazeera, which broadcasts to more than 50 million people
7 and routinely reinforce, I think at least in my view, and
8 we're interested in your view -- reinforce many of these
9 kinds of stereotypes and declines of engrained ways of
10 observing the relationship between the West and the Muslim
11 world. Tell me what that sort of --

12 MR. ASLAN: Yeah, let me start off saying that I
13 think we have to recognize that terrorism is an eminently
14 rational decision. These aren't crazy people who are
15 acting out of, you know, complete abandon or from some
16 sort of irrational place. This is a very rational
17 decision, and the reason why so many groups choose
18 terrorism is because unfortunately, terrorism works.

19 That's the problem with terrorism, and that's
20 why it has been used for millennia to level the
21 battlefield between the very strong and the very weak.
22 But at the same time I don't want you to think --

1 MR. ISHAM: Well, I think you -- sorry to
2 interrupt, but I think you need to explain how you think
3 it works. I think that's a very important point.

4 MR. ASLAN: That's exactly what I was going to
5 say.

6 MR. ISHAM: Okay.

7 MR. ASLAN: But when I say terrorism works, what
8 I mean to say is it doesn't work insofar as achieving some
9 kind of specific political or social agenda; rarely;
10 rarely is the purpose of terrorism to do any such thing.
11 The purpose of terrorism is to provide the illusion of
12 power. The purpose of terrorism is to create an image of
13 the terrorist as somebody whose ideas, whose opinions,
14 whose agendas as lunatic as they may be, as absurd and
15 absolutely inconceivable as they maybe, are nevertheless
16 possible.

17 They are possible because anyone who could take
18 part in such dramatic public displays of violence,
19 exaggerated, even theatrical displays of violence whose
20 purpose is to terrorize the audience, not the actual
21 victims of terrorism themselves that anyone who could
22 achieve such a grand scale act of violence is obviously a

1 powerful force, a force capable of doing great damage.
2 And so we -- our political leaders often speak about Al-
3 Quaeda as this almost supernatural force with the
4 capability, as the President has said repeatedly, "To
5 bring down human civilization as we know it." What? I
6 mean that is absurd, but that's why terrorism works.

7 MR. ISHAM: But sometimes -- but sometimes the
8 terrorism has more limited goals. I mean, if you're going
9 back to -- I was in Lebanon in 1983 in the advent of
10 really the modern suicide bomb when they bombed the U.S.
11 Embassy in April of '83, and the Marine compound in
12 October of '83, and those combined events of course led to
13 the United States redeploying our forces from Lebanon, way
14 off the coast; in other words withdrawing.

15 And that of course was used by Bin Laden in
16 numerous speeches afterwards, in interviews that he did
17 afterwards including the interview he had with us in
18 explaining a lot of their ammo, which is they -- they saw
19 the weakness of the United States, they saw the soft spot
20 of the United States. His argument is the United States -
21 - the American people have no stomach for casualties.
22 They can't absorb casualties, so that if we can hit them

1 and hit them hard enough they will leave, and we can
2 accomplish our objectives. It was very specific, almost
3 tactical objectives.

4 MR. ASLAN: Right, but I want to make a very
5 distinct difference as I said, in the first comments that
6 I made between jihadism as this global movement and these
7 deeply nationalistic organizations like Hezbollah or Hamas
8 who are not jihadists, who have absolutely nothing in
9 common with jihadism whatsoever, who cannot be referred to
10 as jihadist ideologues in any sense of the term. And that
11 -- and whose only comparison -- the only thing that they
12 have in common with jihadism is that they just happen to
13 use the same tactic; terrorism, and they happen to use
14 Islam as the --

15 MR. ISHAM: So do you agree that --

16 MR. ASLAN: -- as the sort of the motivation for
17 their terrorist tactics.

18 MR. HAQQANI: I think, this needs to be passed
19 around a little and I don't think we have the time to do
20 that. But there is -- there are jihadi influences that
21 are now taking over nationalistic movements and we should
22 be --

1 MR. ASLAN: Insofar -- and that's what I was
2 saying before. Insofar as those groups who had been
3 solely focused on the near enemy and on these
4 nationalistic -- and losing very deeply, deeply losing
5 movements for national liberation or to create Islamic
6 states or Islamic societies, have begun to adopt jihadist
7 ideologies and jihadist strategies even, in order to
8 actually gain some kind of, you know, global recognition.
9 And so you have groups --

10 MR. HAQQANI: And resources -- and resources
11 they've, because --

12 MR. ASLAN: But there are no resources going
13 from Al-Qaeda to Hezbollah. There are no resources going
14 from Al-Qaeda to Hamas at all.

15 MR. HAQQANI: Look, it's not from Al-Qaeda the
16 organization, but the idea of Al-Qaeda was global. You
17 could actually fight in Afghanistan but raise funds all
18 over the world. You could bring volunteers from all over
19 the world. And that is happening, the whole notion of --

20 MR. ASLAN: That's right.

21 MR. HAQQANI: -- of getting a global
22 fundraising, global organization. So they are learning

1 from one another. But without going into that, let me go
2 back to your original question. And how does terrorism
3 work? I think that it's -- again, we just read one text
4 and we take that and we become prisoners of our clichés.
5 The lesson of Lebanon was that the Americans don't have a
6 stomach for casualties, but the lesson of Iraq is that the
7 Americans don't have a stomach for long engagement. So
8 the Al-Qaeda -- Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had a famous saying
9 when he was operations leader of Al-Qaeda. He was -- they
10 lost an operation, and there was this internal discussion,
11 and you know how Al-Qaeda has these really doctrinaire
12 internal discussions. I mean, right now at Hudson we have
13 this 400,000 pages downloaded of material of every kind of
14 intellectual discussion and discourse. Not every
15 intellectual, but it's --

16 MR. ISHAM: They seem to have a lot of free time
17 on their hands.

18 MR. HAQQANI: Well, some of them. I mean, there
19 are those who are not operational; they are thinking,
20 which is fine for them. So one of the things was he had a
21 maxim. They lost on an operation, and he said, "When we
22 lose, we learn." Nice little cliché. When we lose, we

1 learn. So they also learn. So let's not be stuck with
2 their lesson that they learned from Lebanon.

3 Yes, what they learned was America doesn't have
4 a stomach for casualties, which was fine for about 15
5 years-20 years. Now America has shown, no, we have the
6 spine; we can go and fight. The new lesson is, no, if we
7 can just keep them in there for long enough -- because
8 Americans have short attention spans, they want immediate
9 success, they cannot contemplate. And Mullah Omer said it
10 all recently in his famous statement, "The Americans have
11 the best watches; we have the time."

12 (Laughter)

13 MR. ASLAN: And let me just add, bin Laden has
14 made this very, very, very clear. His goal is not to
15 defeat America; that's impossible. His goal is to
16 bankrupt America, and he's said that repeatedly over and
17 over again.

18 MR. HAQQANI: And some of them are arguing that
19 we've already started the bankruptcy process, not in terms
20 of money et cetera, but their morals and their
21 intellectual discourse et cetera is already becoming
22 bankrupt because their founding ideas, they are

1 compromising them.

2 MR. ASLAN: Oh yes.

3 MR. HAQQANI: They're getting crazy, they're
4 going crazy, about civil liberties et cetera, and that's
5 our victory because we're making Americans non-American by
6 getting them engaged with us. So we're actually
7 diminishing their value as a nation, as a society. And
8 that's why I keep saying this is all about the idea. And
9 unfortunately, in the last five years in this country my
10 frustration is that every time, especially people in
11 government or dealing with government and think tanks and
12 all that, what they want is an operational strategy to
13 defeat Al-Qaeda. They don't want to engage with the idea
14 of Jihadism at the same level. Reza, myself who deal with
15 the world of ideas in the Muslim world. People don't have
16 time enough for that.

17 MR. ISHAM: Yeah, well --

18 MS. MOGAHED: I think --

19 MR. ISHAM: Sorry. Yeah, Dalia, shoot.

20 MS. MOGAHED: I think that actually the main
21 goal of terrorism is to -- I don't actually think that
22 they're trying to make ludicrous ideas seem plausible or

1 that they are trying to look powerful so that their
2 ludicrous ideas can seem more plausible. I actually think
3 that they exploit broadly felt legitimate grievances. And
4 what they're trying to do is essentially -- I mean, it's a
5 battle between them and those who want to make the same
6 changes through peaceful means. I mean I think it's
7 simply an equation. And so what -- for example, this
8 might seem strange, but Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote this very
9 important book about the problems, the inherent flaws, of
10 the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt.

11 SPEAKER: Yeah.

12 MS. MOGAHED: And his essential problem with
13 them is that they're trying to make change through
14 political means by being inside a corrupt system. You
15 have to completely divorce yourself of the system and
16 fight outside of it. So we have to be very clear of the
17 fact that they, like the polling has shown, aren't
18 fighting for things that people can't recognize or can't -
19 - don't resonate with people.

20 I mean, if you -- when we do ask Muslims, do you
21 want the United States to get their bases out of the Holy
22 Land? Of course, overwhelming majority want bases out of

1 Saudi Arabia; overwhelming majority wants United States
2 out of Iraq and so forth. So what they are trying to do
3 is give people hope in a non-diplomatic, non-political way
4 to change things. The only way that I think that you can
5 combat that is to empower people who are trying to make
6 the same changes in non-violent means and to show the
7 world that this is possible.

8 (Applause)

9 MR. HAQQANI: Yes. But we haven't even talked
10 about the near enemy and how much people actually hate the
11 near enemy.

12 MR. ISHAM: Right.

13 MS. MOGAHED: Yeah.

14 MR. HAQQANI: In many cases the regimes that the
15 United States are most closely identified with are the
16 most hated regimes in the Muslim world.

17 MR. ISHAM: I think that we really need to open
18 this up.

19 MR. HAQQANI: Sure.

20 SPEAKER: We're running out of -- this is very
21 interesting, and we're really, I think, just beginning to
22 drill down on some of these issues, but I'd really like to

1 give people a chance to ask some questions. And if you
2 could just please keep the questions as short and as
3 concise and avoid statements as much as possible, that
4 would be terrific.

5 SPEAKER: Okay. The historian Bernard Lewis,
6 one of his main themes is that the suppression of women's
7 rights in the Muslim world has led partially to its
8 decline. So I'd like you to talk about that for a minute.
9 And also, what about the rise of female suicide bombers or
10 mothers who are encouraging their children?

11 MS. MOGAHED: I can start to talk -- this is an
12 area I do a lot of research into in terms of Muslim women.
13 I think as much as I am personally for the empowerment of
14 Muslim women, to make that as the touchstone of the
15 progress of the society is probably misleading only
16 because when we specifically ask Muslim women what rights
17 do you think you should have, overwhelming majorities will
18 say, we have the right -- we should have the right, it is
19 norm, it is the right way to go to have full rights; full
20 equality with men, the right to vote, drive, work at any
21 job and even serving as leaders of government.

22 So it's not that they have been socially

1 conditioned to believe that they're inferior. But at the
2 same point in time if we ask them what are the most
3 important priorities that you have for your country, what
4 are the most important changes that need to be made,
5 gender issues do not come into the discussion at all. In
6 fact, they are very similar to their male counterparts;
7 it's about political and economic reform.

8 So we really have to advocate for Muslim women
9 by taking their own lead. That -- what -- let's make
10 their priorities our priorities if we're going to advocate
11 for them. The other piece we should also keep in mind is
12 that women's rights and political and economic progress
13 aren't necessarily -- don't necessarily go hand in hand,
14 and there are counter examples to that, believe it or not.
15 The United States, for example, it was the economic
16 development that brought about the women's rights, not the
17 other way around. And several studies have actually shown
18 that egalitarian gender principles come after, not as a
19 predecessor to, economic development.

20 So you need to create a demand for women to
21 enter the public sphere before -- not the other way
22 around. It's not that you empower women and suddenly jobs

1 will appear. Or with 30 percent unemployment among men,
2 it's not that there isn't enough labor. It isn't that
3 they're not utilizing their female labor forces; that
4 there are no jobs. So you -- because women themselves say
5 they want it and because historical that's been the trend,
6 first it's economic and political reform, freedom for
7 everyone, and then women's rights will follow.

8 MR. ISHAM: But there's clearly a difference
9 legally, and in every other way, between women and men, in
10 many countries in the Muslim world. I mean, they are in a
11 legal setting and in many countries their value is exactly
12 50 percent of a man's. And certainly, many countries --

13 MS. MOGAHED: That's a generalization actually,
14 and we don't --

15 MR. ISHAM: No, it's --

16 MR. HAQQANI: But Chris, let me put this in
17 historic context. The women of the United States didn't
18 have the right to vote until 1920, you know? So all I'm
19 saying is -- I'm not disputing the point. I'm trying to
20 make everybody think about it in a linear historic kind of
21 context. Some societies are advanced; some societies are
22 not that advanced. You have to look at the Muslim society

1 not from the prism of how -- will Riyad tomorrow look more
2 like Aspen? You have to start thinking about -- you have
3 to think about what are the basic and fundamental
4 transformational issues in the society.

5 And Bernard Lewis makes many other points which
6 are very important, which is basically a problem with
7 modernity which the Muslim world had and their failure to
8 transform in terms of modernizing many concepts including
9 the educational system. When this whole system of thesis
10 defense, which we have in our colleges originated in
11 Baghdad in the 11th, 12th century, that was the most
12 modern system at that time. If there had been Nobel
13 Prizes in 1007 the Muslims would've got them, but now they
14 are not.

15 So it is a whole issue. Women are part of the
16 problem, but I think that, I agree with Dalia that, it
17 can't be the only thing. It's one of those things that
18 appeals to us more quickly, you know, and some people take
19 advantage of it. It's very easy for a westernized Muslim
20 woman to turn to her western counterparts and say this is
21 all about us being locked up, which is only -- the whole
22 society is locked up.

1 MS. MOGAHED: Exactly, that's --

2 MR. HAQQANI: The whole society's mind is locked
3 up.

4 MR. ISHAM: But I think -- but I guess, I would
5 disagree to some extent. I think some of the most
6 interesting things going on in the Muslim world that I've
7 seen are what's going on with women's movements. I mean,
8 in Iran in particular. There's a women's movements in
9 Iran that right now is in the process of collecting a
10 million signatures --

11 MR. HAQQANI: Absolutely, Chris, but all I'm
12 saying is --

13 MR. ISHAM: -- to stop stoning.

14 MR. HAQQANI: No, but the difference is --

15 MR. ISHAM: And it's very specific; it's very
16 interesting.

17 MR. HAQQANI: The difference is, as having
18 worked for the first woman prime minister in the Muslim
19 world, Benazir Bhutto, let me just say that, yes,
20 absolutely women's empowerment is an important component
21 of a bigger project, to talk of it as something different
22 from the bigger project, which is the transformation of

1 the entire Muslim world. I think sometimes talking of it
2 in isolation, yes; as part of the big whole, absolutely.

3 MR. ISHAM: But perhaps they could be even in
4 something of a vanguard.

5 MR. HAQQANI: Absolutely; the smarter ones
6 already are.

7 SPEAKER: Women in terrorism.

8 MR. HAQQANI: The smarter ones already are you
9 know.

10 MS. MOGAHED: I think I'll just restate my
11 point. I'm not saying that women's issues are not
12 important. Only that they have to be within the framework
13 of a larger reformed agenda around freedom for everyone
14 because what always gets said is it's not only women who
15 are oppressed, okay, there -- everyone is kept down. And
16 I would also say that there is a huge amount of diversity.
17 We cannot generalize over the entire Muslim world. Saudi
18 Arabia is very different from Algeria.

19 MR. ISHAM: Every stretch is different there.

20 MS. MOGAHED: Very different than Palestine.

21 MR. HAQQANI: We didn't address the question
22 about women terrorists, and how -- would you like to take

1 --

2 MS. MOGAHED: Well, I'll just say that our data
3 actually shows that, you know, in terms of the high-
4 conflict group, they are -- about 40 percent are women,
5 60:40. So they are slightly more likely to be men, but
6 not by much.

7 MR. ISHAM: Sir?

8 MR. KLEINER: Thank you. I'm Art Kleiner, an
9 editor of Strategy and Business, and I have a kind of
10 editor's question, which is what ideas would you identify
11 as ideas to watch in the Muslim world that might be worth
12 looking at harbingers of a different future?

13 MR. HAQQANI: Art, some of the -- some of us do
14 this for a living, so maybe you should commission us a
15 piece on this.

16 (Laughter)

17 MR. ISHAM: It's very expensive, I'm warning
18 you.

19 MR. HAQQANI: And pay us for it. That was just
20 for levity. The idea is to watch essentially, and Reza
21 can come in here as well, I think, the whole debate on
22 Islamic reform, what should be the form of understanding;

1 is it religious texts? It's a big debate. It's very
2 powerful in the non-Arab Muslim world; Indonesia,
3 Pakistan, Bangladesh, India. Many theologians have
4 entered it. Some in Europe are participating in it. Then
5 the whole question of -- the ideas of, "Does Islamism have
6 a future?" The difference between Islam and Islamism
7 being Islam is the faith and religion that all of us
8 share, Islamism is the idea that Islam is more than a
9 religion, and should be a political and economic ideology;
10 a big picture.

11 There are those who would argue that Islamism as
12 a whole has failed and there are those who say, no,
13 Islamism needs to be moderated. So what's happening in
14 Turkey, for example, is a moderation of Islamism. Will it
15 succeed? Third, secularization of the Muslim world. What
16 forms of -- there's the Turk model of secularism, which is
17 the State actually rolls back religion from public life
18 and then there's the more modern aspects of secularism
19 that maybe we can be more like America; a lot of people
20 very religious, but the State itself not having a
21 religion. And those are the four of five major debates
22 and social ideas. And last but not least, how much of

1 technology should Muslims adopt and how far behind are we
2 in it and can a quick adaptation and adoption of
3 technology change our society fast enough.

4 MR. ISHAM: Reza, do you have any comments?

5 MR. ASLAN: Yeah, I think those are wonderful
6 examples of things that the Muslim world could learn from
7 the West. Let me flip it and say, well, we could learn
8 from these very exciting ideas being formed in the Muslim
9 world that have nothing to do with the West. There's many
10 of them, but I'll just focus on one in general, one that I
11 think you'd be more interested in, and that is the idea of
12 Islamic finance. Many of you know that according to
13 Islamic law you are not allowed to actually charge
14 interest for -- on money.

15 The easier way to understand this, because
16 sometimes you get stuck on this issue of interest, but in
17 Islamic law you cannot make money from money. Do you
18 understand? Like, you cannot earn money from money. So
19 even a savings account, which gives you money from your
20 money is essentially invalid in traditional Islamic
21 finance. Now, that of course, is the foundation of
22 capitalism. That's what it's based on. It's interest,

1 loans, all these things.

2 And yet, now, especially in the Arab world and
3 particularly with -- in the oil rich regions in the Gulf
4 States, these regions that are not just fantastically
5 wealthy, but are becoming more and more a part of the
6 global economy, are I think doing wonderful work in
7 reconciling capitalist, you know, the global capitalist
8 market and the requirements of it, with what is often
9 referred to as Islamic morality, Islamic finance morals.

10 And so one of the many ways for instance, in
11 which these large banks in the Muslim world are putting
12 this into play is that they will give small businesses
13 loans to start a business, but because they cannot charge
14 interest on that loan, what they do is instead they take a
15 certain percentage of that company's profit. And so
16 therefore are fully invested in making sure that that
17 company succeeds because if the company doesn't succeed,
18 then the bank gets no money, whereas in the western system
19 succeed or fail, you owe me the money that I gave you.

20 So it creates, I think, a far more egalitarian
21 conception of global finance and one that is focused much
22 more on cooperation, on fairness, on economic development

1 and less on, sort of, the amoral concepts of capitalism.
2 That I think is something that we could definitely learn
3 from the economies in the Muslim world who are fashioning
4 this new way of doing business.

5 MS. MOGAHED: One other idea that I think is
6 important to take note of is a growing movement to respond
7 to practices that have for a long time been done in the
8 name of Islam, but to actually respond to why they are
9 wrong within an Islamic framework. So, for example, there
10 was a very important conference held in Cairo a few months
11 ago at Al-Azhar giving an Islamic response to the reasons
12 why female circumcision was not Islamic.

13 So within an Islamic framework actually
14 responding to some of these cultural practices that for a
15 long time have been given an Islamic justification, rather
16 than doing so within the framework of secular human
17 rights.

18 MR. ISHAM: Another idea is to use (inaudible)
19 throwing an idea. Another thing I find fascinating in --
20 pertaining to our topic today is what certainly countries
21 are doing, particularly UAE and Yemen, trying to go into
22 the prisons and reconverting some of the Jihadis --

1 MS. MOGAHED: Right.

2 MR. ISHAM: -- and trying to explain to them,
3 sending in --

4 MR. HAQQANI: With success. With enormous
5 success.

6 MR. ISHAM: With success Sending in clerics
7 and sending in people who really know the Koran and know
8 the Hadith and really going in there and arguing and
9 debating with these guys and turning them around. And I
10 think that's fascinating.

11 MS. MOGAHED: I think that from the data around
12 the high degree of religiosity and how important religion
13 is in the Muslim world, that is going to be the only
14 successful method we have. Going in and talking about
15 women's rights from a secular human right's perspective,
16 you're just not going to get a response; or anti-
17 terrorism; from any other perspective other than through
18 the framework of an idea that they already have, that they
19 already cherish. It's just simply not going to work. So
20 I think that this process of arguing these things within
21 an Islamic framework is very important very important to
22 watch.

1 MR. ASLAN: Very important.

2 MR. ISHAM: Yeah, next question.

3 MS. HAZAM: Hi, I'm Meghan Hussey (phonetic),
4 one of the BEZOS student scholars, and my question is
5 regarding education as a means of fighting terrorism. Do
6 you think it could be useful both in the sense of
7 improving education in the Muslim world to bring more
8 empowerment and less humiliation, but also education in
9 the United States making Islamic history more of an
10 important component of world history, Arabic as a language
11 taught? Do you think that could be useful in promoting
12 cross cultural understanding and ultimately improve our
13 situation?

14 MR. HAQQANI: Absolutely.

15 MS. MOGAHED: Absolutely.

16 MR. ASLAN: No question.

17 MR. HAQQANI: Yeah. I mean, the Muslim world
18 has low literacy rates. The Muslim world has low
19 education rates and less accomplishment in the field of
20 learning. There's a big knowledge gap in the Muslim
21 world. We all know that. But very frankly, in the United
22 States there's another problem, and that is you can have a

1 college degree, but you know nothing but English spoken
2 with an American accent. And, you know the -- and, for
3 example, only nine percent American college students
4 enroll in another language program; half of whom do it in
5 Spanish, and half of whom don't complete their language
6 training.

7 So -- it's not just the language though. It's
8 the willingness to learn about other cultures. Only 20
9 percent of Americans apply for passports, Your Honor. The
10 president of the United States goes to India and doesn't
11 visit the Taj Mahal, you know. So that needs to change
12 here as well because if the United States is going to be
13 the world's leader, a leader must know more about what
14 exists out there that they are leading. And I think both
15 things need to be done. Educational promotion in the
16 Muslim world and awareness in the United States of what
17 the world is all about of which the Muslim world is a
18 very, very important component.

19 MR. ISHAM: On an end note, I think we should
20 thank our panel.

21 (Applause)

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